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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the International Law Commission ("ILC") authored a Draft
Statute' in an attempt to help establish a permanent International Criminal
Court ("ICC"). Beginning in March 1996 the United Nations General
*
This article was written in June 1998, just prior to the Rome Diplomatic Conference,
which completed and adopted the Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court. This article
discusses the expectations heading into the final diplomatic conference, and examines the statutory
debate, which had been undertaken prior to Rome.
Michael Bachrach represented the New York County Lawyers' Association at the August
1997 United National Preparatory Committee Meeting for the establishment of a permanent
International Criminal Court ("PrepCom"), and represented Redress Trust (UK) at the December
1997 and March-April 1998 PrepComs. He has also chaired conferences on the International
Criminal Court in New York City and Vienna. This report is based on the closed and open door
meetings that he attended during the Prepcoms, as well as research completed at the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law in New York City, and at Oxford University in England.
1.
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session,
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. DOC A/49/355, Sept. 1, 1994.
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Assembly held Preparatory Committee meetings ("PrepComs") ° in which
the representatives of the majority of the world's nations gathered to debate
the various aspects of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute. 2 Each PrepCom lasted
between two and three weeks and was essentially a preparatory conference,
designed to facilitate debate and fine-tune each State's concerns.
The final PrepCom was held from March 16 to April 3, 1998. At this
final PrepCom the 1994 ILC Draft Statute was replaced by a new text, the
Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting from January 19 through January 30,
1998 in Zutphen, The Netherlands ("Zutphen Draft"), which formed the
basis of the remainder of the debate leading up to a Diplomatic Conference
which will take place from June 15 to July 17, 1998, in Rome, Italy
("Rome Conference"). 3 Furthermore, after the completion of the final
PrepCom, the official texts ("CRP's") were compiled into one document,
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Part I, Draft Statute for the International
Criminal Court.4 This final compiled document revised the Zutphen text to
reflect the Proposals of the March-April 1998 PrepCom, and will serve as
the basic draft text of the Rome Conference. "There is international
momentum, that by [June] we must establish an effective, efficient, and
independent International Criminal Court,"' the statute for which, it is
hoped, will be completed and ready for signature by the end of the
Diplomatic Conference.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the progression of some of the
key issues that have been under debate, in an attempt to help explain the
creation of the "last great legal edifice of the 20th Century. "6

2.
Although only State representatives have an official place in the negotiations,
participating on one level or another are representatives of various subsidiary organizations of the
United Nations such as the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, as well as other international and non-governmental organizations such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross, UNICEF, Amnesty International, Redress, and the
Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights. Furthermore, this is by no means an exhaustive list of
the organizations involved in the PrepComs. For example, working under the umbrella
organization of the Coalition for an International Criminal Court, over 450 non-governmental
organizations have lobbied for. the inclusion or exclusion of numerous proposals relating to these
debates.
3.
See generally, "Zutphen Draft," U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/L.13, (1998).
4.
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. AICONF.1832Add.1 (1988).
5.
Roy S. Lee, Director, Codifications, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations,
addressing the American Branch of the International Bar Association on Nov. 7, 1997 at its
International Law Weekend '97 during the panel "The Establishment of a Permanent International
Criminal Court: The Need, The Possibilities and the Legal, Political and Practical Realities."
6.
Richard C. Hottelet, A Forum for International Justice, THE CHRISTIAN SC.
MONrrOR, Aug. 26, 1997, p. 18.
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A.

The Purpose of the InternationalCriminal Court
For years lawyers, politicians, and lay persons have grappled with the
problem of what can be done when there is no justice left to be had. Over
the past fifty years some of the most horrendous atrocities in recorded
history have unfolded. With the creation of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, for the first time leaders and their peoples were
held individually accountable for massive violations of international
standards of conduct. Unfortunately, many States and individuals have
failed to learn from the mistakes of World War II and the Holocaust. Over
the past 50 years there have been approximately 250 conflicts, totaling over
170 million casualties-more casualties than World War I and World War
II combined.7 Most recently, in 1994 following the breakup of Yugoslavia,
Bosnians, Serbians and Croatians, entered into a war that practiced "ethnic
cleansing" in a manner not seen since the Holocaust.! Also in 1994, a civil
war ensued in Rwanda involving the killing of almost 500,000 people. 9 To
many it appeared that every inhabitant of Rwanda was transformed into
both a victim, and a butcher. The law cannot stand silent to crimes so
heinous that domestic judicial systems have no adequate solutions. "These
types of crimes cannot go forth without some form of accountability, some
form of punishment, at least for the most egregious crimes like aggression,
genocide, and ...torture."' 0
As the dawning of a new millennium quickly approaches, and
international atrocities continue to proliferate, the international community
continues to strive for new ways to bring peace and security to the world.
In 1993, Trinidad and Tobago suggested that a permanent international
criminal tribunal should be established to try international terrorists and
narcotics dealers. Although the international community did not agree
upon those bases of subject matter jurisdiction, there was support for a
court that would try violators of what many consider the most serious
breaches of international law: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. Learning from the successes of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the
idea of a permanent ICC raised the hope of furthering international

7.
Dekar Declaration for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998,
Dakar, 6 Feb. 1998; European Parliament Resolution on the International Criminal Court, Mar.
12, 1998.
8.

See generally, NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY (1996).

9.

See generally, GtRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE

(1995).
10.

Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, Vice Chair, UN Preparatory Committee of the

Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court, addressing the American Branch of
the International Bar Association on Nov. 7, 1997 at its International Law Weekend '97 during
the panel "The Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court: The Need, The

Possibilities and the Legal, Political and Practical Realities."
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cooperation, thereby enhancing "the effective prosecution and suppression
of crimes of international concern.""
B.

Issues under debate
Almost every aspect of the proposed ICC is still being debated. These
issues range from the number of judges required for a quorum, to the
specific definition of crimes against humanity. However, the issues which
have garnered possibly the most debate are: the consent and triggering
process of the Court; the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court; the
balance between international and domestic judicial systems, known as
complementarity; the process of investigation; and the types of penalties
that the Court will have the authority to impose.
Although the specific definitions of the core crimes (the crimes that
shall comprise the Court's subject matter jurisdiction) are still under fierce
debate, the categories of core crimes which will be incorporated into the
Court's statute has been mostly determined. The ILC Draft Statute
proposed jurisdiction over genocide, aggression, war crimes, crimes again
humanity, and a list of treaty based crimes mostly relating to human rights
or terrorism.' 2 Although there will continue to be debate over the subject
matter jurisdiction of the Court until a resolution is officially announced in
Rome, it appears that only genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
and of the others, only aggression still
humanity are certain to be retained,
3
retains even a minimal chance.'
On the other hand, the debates over trigger mechanisms, investigation,
complementarity, and penalties are still unresolved; it is these issues that
this paper will examine.' 4
II. TRIGGER MECHANISMS (PRECONDITIONS TO JURISDICTION)

Whenever a new situation arises where the ICC is the preferred forum
for adjudication, it will be necessary to "trigger" the Court into action.
For the ICC to preside over any given situation it must not only have
subject matter jurisdiction, but it must also have personal jurisdiction over
individual defendants. However, because this will be an international
court, as opposed to a domestic court, the hurdles necessary to acquire
such jurisdiction do not merely turn on the place of arrest or place of the
crime, but also on the broader concept of State consent.
See supra note 3.
11.
12. Art. 20, U.N. DOC. A/49/355.
13. Many conclusions such as this one are based not upon formal written proposals but
rather on oral interventions or informal comments. However, when possible, citations to written
proposals will be noted.
14. This paper will not discuss the specific definitional debate still undergoing over the
Court's core crimes; so much remains unresolved that any fair discussion would require a separate
paper of its own.
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Under customary international law, there are several different bases of
maintaining personal jurisdiction through State consent:
(1) The Territorial Principle - All crimes, be them acts or
omissions, which were "committed (or alleged to have been
committed) within the [territory] of a State may, come before the
municipal courts and the accused if convicted may be sentenced.
This is so even where the offenders are foreign citizens; " 15 (2)
The Nationality Principle - "By virtue of nationality, a person
becomes entitled to a series of rights ranging from obtaining a
valid passport enabling him to travel abroad to being able to vote.
... The concept of nationality is important since it determines the
benefits to which persons may be entitled and the obligations
(such as conscription) which they must perform;" 16 (3) The
Passive Personality Principle
"[A] State will claim
jurisdiction to try an individual for offenses committed abroad
which have affect or will affect nationals of the State;" 17(4) The
Protective Principle - "[S]tates may exercise jurisdiction over
aliens who have committed an act abroad which is deemed
prejudicial to the security of the particular State concerned;s18 and
(5), The Universality Principle - Crimes of the most egregious
manner, such as piracy and war crimes, can be tried by any court,
because the international sphere as a whole is involved.' 9

15. M.N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW 401 (1995). See The Lotus Case (France v.
Turkey), P.C.I.J., Series A, no. 10, 1927, 4 I.L.R. 153.
16. Shaw, supra note 15, at 404. See Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco Case,
P.C.I.J., Series B, no. 4, 1923, 2 I.L.R. 349 ("The question of whether a certain matter is or is
not solely within the jurisdiction of a state is an essentially relative question, it depends upon the
development of international relations. Thus in the present state of international law, questions of
nationality are, in the opinion of this court, in principle within this reserved domain."). The
problem is that there is no consistent, accepted definition of nationality in international law and
only the conflicting descriptions of the different municipal laws of States, Shaw, p. 404. Civil
law States tend to claim jurisdiction based on all crimes committed by their nationals, whereas
common law States tend to restrict their claims regarding their nationals abroad to only very
serious crimes. Id. at 407. But see The Nottebolm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955
I.C.J. 4, 22 I.L.R. 349 (Nationality is "a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the
existence of reciprocal rights and duties.").
17. Shaw, supra note 15, at 408. See The Cutting Case, (1886), Moore, DIG OF INT'L
LAW, 1906, vol. 2, p. 228.
18.. Shaw, supra note 15, at 410. See Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946]
A.C. 347, 15 I.L.R. 91.
19. Shaw, supra note 15, at 411. See Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v.
Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (1961); The Barbie Cases (Matter of Barbie), [19831 Gaz.Pal.Jur. 710
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These five principles, as well as the obligations of treaties, have been
used by domestic courts to maintain jurisdiction over individuals which
have more than one State attempting to claim jurisdiction. However, an
international court, if its statute allowed, could also base jurisdiction under
these principles, or others specifically outlined in its statute or other
treaties.
According to the 1994 ILC Draft Statute, the Court could exercise its
jurisdiction in several different ways. First, in a case of genocide, the
Court could exercise its jurisdiction whenever a State party to the 1948
Genocide Conventione" lodges a complaint with the Prosecutor which
alleges "that a crime of genocide appears to have been committed." 2'
Second, in the case of aggression, the Court could exercise jurisdiction if
the Security Council "has first determined that a State has committed the
act of aggression which is the subject of the complaint."' The Security
Council could also refer any other case to the Court, which it deemed
appropriate so long as the Security Council was acting under its Chapter23
VII powers to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Furthermore, the ILC Draft Statute provided that in any other case
charging one or more of the core crimes, the ICC could exercise its
jurisdiction when consent has been granted to the Court by the State which
has custody of the suspect ("the custodial State") and the State maintaining
territorial jurisdiction.
To some it appeared that the ILC Draft Statute offered a fair
distribution of power between the States, the Security Council, and the
ICC. However, many States objected to this formulation of the Court's
preconditions to its exercise of jurisdiction.
During the negotiations
several alternative proposals were offered which subtly yet drastically
changed the jurisdictional authority of the proposed ICC.
A.

The Role of the Security Council
Beyond what was mentioned above, the ILC Draft Statute also
included a very controversial provision relating to the consent process.
The ILC Draft Statute provided that "a complaint of or directly related to
an act of aggression," or any other breach of international peace and
security, could not be brought under the ILC Draft Statute unless "the
Security Council first determined that a State [had] committed the act or
(Cass.Crim. Oct. 6, 1983), 78 I.L.R. 78, 125, 136; Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1198, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986).
20. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (1948).
21. Art. 25, U.N. DOC. A/49/355.
22. Art. 23(2), U.N. DOC. A/49/355.
23. Art. 23(1), U.N. DOC. A/49/355.
24. Art. 21, U.N. DOC. A/49/355.
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omission which [was] the subject of the complaint. "' In essence this
provision would allow the Security Council to prevent the ICC from
obtaining jurisdiction over any matter falling within the Security Council's
Chapter VII powers. This provision became one of the greatest areas of
dispute in regards to the ICC's jurisdictional procedure.
During the August 1997 PrepCom the United States took the position
that the Security Council should be the sole body with the power to
authorize or prevent any situation from being referred to the ICC. The
United States acknowledged that placing the triggering mechanisms of the
Court into the Security Council would be placing the burden of determining
jurisdiction into a political institution, but the United States also believed
that the same would be true if the consent process was left to
governments.26 The United States intervention hinted at the possible
expansion of the Security Council, and explained that this expansion would
help dilute the political pitfall that the institution currently maintained.
According to the United States intervention, "when the Security Council
reform process concludes, we expect that the representation of a much
wider cross-section of the global society will have been accomplished.
Any decision that the Security Council makes with respect to the referral of
a situation. to the ICC thus will reflect the considered judgment of that
larger and more representative group of nations. "27
Not surprisingly, other members of the Security Council shared the
US sentiment that the ICC's jurisdiction should be subordinate to the
decisions of the Security Council. The French delegate stated on 6 August
1997, that national courts should handle all crimes, and that this right
should only be taken away if the Security Council decides it is necessary to
refer the matter to the International Criminal Court.28 Furthermore, the
delegate argued that this would not be a step backwards, both legally and
politically speaking, because this was the method that had been employed
during the creation of all of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals.
Germany made a proposal, which was much more expansive than the
proposal by France. The German delegation proposed that the ICC should
have jurisdiction through several methods: 1) a Security Council referral;
2) a complaint lodged by an interested State; or 3), if the Prosecutor
concludes that there is a sufficient basis for prosecution. 29 Furthermore,
for their proposal to be successful the German delegation believed it was

25.

Art. 23(2), U.N. DOC. A/49/355.

26. Report of the United States Delegation to the Preparatory Committee of the
International Criminal Court - Amendments to arts. 23, 25 ("Trigger Mechanism") (Aug. 8,
1997).
27.

id.

28.

Oral Intervention by French delegation on Aug.6, 1997.

29.

Modified German draft proposal of 1996, Aug. 6, 1997.
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necessary that all parties to the ICC Statute must accept the inherent
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to all of its core crimes.30
As might be evident, the role of the Security Council in respect to the
ICC continues to be hotly debated, but the proposals have turned more on
subtly than anything else. Throughout the debate, the two sides laid there
anchors either upon the stance initiated by the ILC Draft Statute, and
furthered by the five permanent members of the Security Council ("P5"),
that the Security Council must consent as a precondition to the ICC's
jurisdiction, or upon the broader belief that the Security Council was
merely one of several methods in which a matter could be referred to the
Court. Interestingly, it was Singapore, one of the smallest nations, that put
forth the proposal that has now gained the favor of the majority of States
including the United Kingdom3 (and possibly soon the United States32).
The compromise, appropriately dubbed, "The Singapore Proposal", states
that "no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with
under this statute where the Security Council has, acting under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations, given a direction to that effect. "3
Here the importance of subtle changes is extremely evident. Under the P5
proposals the ICC could only have jurisdiction over a matter referred to it
by the Security Council. However, under the Charter of the United
Nations, any declaration by the Security Council can be vetoed by the
single vote of any of its permanent members. 34 Thus, if the United States,
United Kingdom, France, China, or the Russian Federation did not want
the matter to be referred to the ICC, any one of them could prevent it with
a simple veto. However, under the Singapore Proposal, the ICC has the
ability to act not once the Security Council so declares, but rather until the
Security Council declares otherwise. Therefore, under the Singapore
Proposal, a single vote of a permanent member would not be enough to
rescind the ICC's jurisdiction, rather a single .vote would be all that was
required to prevent the Security Council's interference.
It should be pointed out that in the debate over Security Council
referrals, most States have held strong to the belief that "the statute should
give to the Security Council the explicit competence to submit to the Court
situations involving threats to or breaches of international peace and
security and acts of aggression. '3 But, as Germany stated on the first day
30. Id.
31.
Proposal by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Trigger
Mechanism, U.N. DOC. AIAC.249/IWG.3/DP.1 (1998).
32. John M. Goshko, A Shift on Role of UN Court? Envoy Suggests US May Alter
Demands on Proposed Tribunal, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1998 at A2.
33. Non-Paper/WG.3/No.16, Aug. 8, 1997.
34. Article 27(3), Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153
(1945).
35. Statement by Hans-Peter Kaul, Head of the German delegation, on Aug. 4, 1997.
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of the August 1997 PrepCom, "it would be in our view quite inappropriate
if the Security Council could submit individual cases or prevent the
investigation and prosecution of cases involving such situations." 36 The
distinction here by Germany is that the Security Council should be given
the ability to refer matters, issues, or situations to the Court, but that it was
the Court's responsibility to choose individual cases that arise out of those
broader referrals.
In the beginning of the final PrepCom in March 1998, the ILC Draft
Statute was replaced by a newer draft known as the Zutphen Draft (or
"Zutphen text"). However, by the end of the PrepCom much of the text
had been further revised, including the provisions relating to the role of the
Security Council in the consent and triggering process.
Regarding
aggression there was still much disagreement over an acceptable definition
and trigger mechanism, however, in relation to all of the core crimes, only
two options remain which explain the Security Council's role in the
triggering process. Both options were inserted as Article 10 paragraph 3.37
The first option stated that no prosecution could be commenced if the
Security Council decided there was a breach of international peace and
security, unless the Security Council consented to such prosecution. 8 On
the other hand, the second option reflected the input of the Singapore
Proposal, allowing the ICC to act without first requiring the consent of the
Security Council. The second proposal also stated that although the
Security Council could determine that a prosecution should not proceed, it
required that the Security Council act within a reasonable amount of time, 9
and if it failed to act within that time, the ICC could proceed without the
Security Council's consent.' °
B.

Interested States
As stated in the previous section, under a proposal submitted by
Germany during the August 1997 PrepCom, the Court could exercise
jurisdiction not only when the matter is referred to the Court by the
Security Council, but also if the complaint is lodged by an interested State,
or by the Prosecutor. 41 Although the role of the Security Council is
possibly the most potentially crippling portion of the Court's consent
process, easily the least controversial method occurs when the interested

36. Id.
37. Art. 10(7), supra note 4, art. 10(7).A/CONF.183/2/Add.1.
38. Draft Statute Proposal to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/CRP.8, (April 2, 1998); supra note 4.
39. What totals a reasonable amount of time has not yet been determined; proposals have
ranged from 30 days to one year.
40. See supra note 38, A/AC.249/ICRP.8, (1998); supra note 4, A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1.
41.
Modified German draft proposal of 1996, Aug. 6, 1997.
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States consent to the Court's personal jurisdiction. But who are the
interested States and how many are needed to consent?
Initially, States such as France proposed that the interested States
could be: 1) the State on whose territory the acts were committed; 2) the
State of the nationality of the victim of those acts; and 3), the State of the
nationality of the person suspected of committing the acts.42 France's
proposal was based upon the jurisdictional theories of territoriality, passive
personality, and nationality, respectively. But soon it became evident that
other States might also warrant sufficient concern over the incident to
require their consent to the ICC's jurisdiction. The Russian Federation,
among other States, believed that custodiality should also be added as a
basis of necessary State consent.43 Custodiality, being defined as, "the
State which has custody of the suspect with respect to the crime.""
Furthermore, a majority of States believed that the existence of extradition
treaties might also form a basis of the Court's jurisdiction. Thus, by the
end of the August 1997 PrepCom the above four bases of jurisdiction were
included in the definition of interested States, plus a fifth, "if applicable,
the State that has requested, under an international agreement, the custodial
State to surrender a45 suspect for the purpose of prosecution, unless the
request is rejected."
In addition to the debate over which States could claim jurisdiction,
there was also debate over how many of these interested States should be
required to offer their consent before the ICC could maintain jurisdiction
over the case. For these issues to be settled, some questions needed to be
answered: is unanimous consent required, do only one or two States need
to consent, or should the Court have inherent jurisdiction over the core
crimes? Obviously, if every State consented to the Court's jurisdiction
then there would be no problem for the Court. Such broad consent,
however, is not always the likely scenario. Thus, there was great debate
over the minimum number of interested States that were required to
consent for the Court to exercise jurisdiction. There was universal
agreement that if consensual jurisdiction was utilized as the basis of the
Court's jurisdiction, it would be necessary to require more than one
concerned State to consent, but how many more was undecided. Israel and
France, for example, believed it necessary for the complainant State, the
custodial State, and the State of nationality of the accused, to all consent in
order for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction.4 As explained by the
42. France - Amended Proposals, arts. 21, 22 of the International Law Comm'n (Nonpaper/WG.3/No. 12) (Aug. 7, 1997).
43. Proposal of the Russian Federation on arts. (Non-paper/Non-Paper/WG.3/No.13,
Aug. 8, 1997.WG.3/No. 13) (Aug. 8, 1997).
44. Id.
45. Id.; supra note 38; see supra note 4.
46. Oral intervention made on Aug. 7, 1997.
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delegate from Niger, this proposal would seem the most realistic because it
would enable the investigation to be much more efficient than if the Court
were acting without the consent, or against the wishes, of one of those
interested parties.47 On the other hand, many other States believed that
such broad requirements would severely hinder prosecution at the most
formative stage of the proceedings. These States have advocated that it
should be up to the Office of the Prosecutor s to decide whether the Court
should or should not exercise its jurisdiction over a case, that the Court
should have inherent jurisdiction over its cases.
Before continuing, an important question must be addressed: What
exactly is inherent jurisdiction?
Simply put, the theory of inherent
jurisdiction means that by ratifying the ICC's Statute, States at that point
have accepted the automatic jurisdiction of the Court over all of the core
crimes, thus obviating the need to obtain further individual consent of all
the interested States. As stated by the representative of Ireland, "we
should rely on an old-fashioned concept, the concept of justice." 4 9
Essentially, the representative of Ireland proffered that by requiring States
accept the inherent jurisdiction of the ICC, as a condition to signing the
treaty, States would be prevented from allowing political considerations to
mar traditional notions of justice. Therefore, any State which would want
the protection of the Court, would also itself have to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court. Although many States seemed to believe that
inherent jurisdiction might make for the most effective court, political
concerns prevented them from fully supporting the idea. David Scheffer,
United States Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes, explained the United
States' position.
There is a reality, and .the reality is that the United States is a
global military power and presence. Other countries are not. We
are. Our forces are often called upon to engage overseas in
conflict situations, for purposes of humanitarian intervention, to
rescue hostages, to bring our American citizens from threatening
environments, to deal with terrorists. We have to be extremely
careful that this proposal does not limit the capacity of our armed
forces to legitimately operate internationally. We have to be
careful that it does not open up opportunities for endless frivolous
complaints to be lodged against the United States as a global
military poweri 0

47.

Id.

48.
49.

Also referred to as the Procuracy, see art. 12, A/49/355; art. 36, A/AC.249//L. 13.
Oral intervention made on Aug.7, 1997.

50.

Barbara Crossette, World Criminal Court Having a Painfid Birth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.

13, 1997, at A10 (quoting David Scheffer).
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In Ambassador Scheffer's remarks, he highlighted an important
problem for these negotiations: supposedly neutral legal matters were
completely colored by political concerns. Thus, often times the debate
over appropriate preconditions to jurisdiction turned on which core crimes
were in question. As the United States pointed out, no one was arguing for
inherent jurisdiction over all of the core crimes, but with respect to
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, there was at least some
basis for discussion over whether inherent jurisdiction could be involved."'
The Russian Federation proposed that only genocide should be held to the
standard of inherent jurisdiction, whereas ICC jurisdiction over the other
core crimes needed the consent of the appropriate interested States."
Furthermore, the United States pointed out that the crime of aggression had
to be viewed differently from the other core crimes assuming it was
included in the Statute at all because jurisdiction over aggression could
never be based upon inherent jurisdiction without the precondition of a
Security Council referral; to ignore the Security Council in relation to
aggression would be in direct conflict with Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations which grants the Security Council the power to
determine when a breach of international peace and security has occurred,
and what actions should be taken to resolve the situation.53 Even Germany,
one of staunchest supporters of the idea of a fully independent ICC,
divided the crimes as follows:
the Court should have inherent (automatic) jurisdiction over the
three core crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes, so that the Court can exercise, if necessary, concurrent
jurisdiction with each State party. The Court should also have
inherent jurisdiction with regard to the crime of aggression once
the Security Council . . . has 4first determined that a State has
committed an act of aggression.5
By the time the final PrepCom concluded in April 1998, it had become
apparent that the only crime that stood a good chance of being
characterized as a crime over which the Court had inherent jurisdiction was
the crime of genocide. This is because of all of the core crimes, only the
definition used for genocide has achieved the benchmark of customary
international law. Aggression has never been defined in a prospective
manner that States can agree upon, and although war crimes and crimes
51. Oral intervention made on Aug. 7, 1997.
52. Non-Paper/WG.3/No.13.
53. Article 39, Charter of the United Nations; Oral intervention made on Aug. 7, 1997.
This conclusion assumes that the Security Council would not agree to amend the Charter of the
United Nations so as to comply with the Statute of the ICC.
54. Statement by Hans-Peter Kaul, Head of the German delegation, on Aug. 4, 1997.
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against humanity have been sufficiently defined by the Geneva
Conventions 5 and its protocols,56 the drafters of the ICC Statute felt it
necessary to modernize the language of those conventions when including
them into the ICC Statute. By modernizing the definitions of war crimes
and crimes against humanity, as opposed to merely incorporating the
language already accepted as customary international law, it becomes
harder to reach the universal consensus necessary for States to agree to
accept inherent jurisdiction over those crimes. The final text leading up to
the diplomatic conference leaves many of these issues greatly unresolved.
The five interested States defined earlier, were all included in the text, but
it was still unclear whether all or none would have to consent as a
precondition to the Court's jurisdiction. 7
C.

ProsecutorialReferral
The next method of trigger mechanism under consideration was that of
a prosecutorial referral. Initially, the Draft Statute did not provide for this
type of trigger mechanism. According to the ILC Draft the prosecutor
could only act for the purpose of investigation or otherwise, once the issue
had been referred to it by an interested State or the Security Council.5"
However, according to the Zutphen text and its revisions, the Court may
have jurisdiction with respect to its core crimes if the matter is brought by
the Prosecutor in accordance with information received through its own
investigations.59 Utilizing prosecutorial referrals as a trigger mechanism
could only work with regard to crimes over which the Court maintained
inherent jurisdiction, or over crimes which the situation and not merely
individual defendants, had already been consented and directed to the Court
by either the Security Council or the necessary States. Furthermore, for
States to agree to incorporate the Prosecutor as a trigger mechanism in the
ICC's statute, their decision will be highly dependent on what further
agreement can be made regarding the Prosecutor's ability to initiate its own
investigations. Most States will not agree to a trigger mechanism that
would provide for a Prosecutor with unfettered discretion.

55. The Four Geneva "Red Cross" Conventions of 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; 75 U.N.T.S.
135; 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (1949).
56. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977);
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
57. See supra note 38; see supra note 4.
58. Arts. 21, 23, and 26, A/49/355.
59. Arts. 6 and 46, A/AC.249//L.13 (1998); A/AC.249/CRP.8 (1998); arts. 6 and 12,
A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1.
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III. INVESTIGATION

As is the case in any fair trial, either domestic or international, before
a suspect can be indicted by the Court an investigation must ensue which
concludes that sufficient evidence exists to show that a trial of the accused
is warranted.
Domestically, investigations are initiated by the local
governments through the prosecutor's office. Since the prosecutor is an
agent of the State, the State does not attempt to prevent or hinder the
investigations.
Internationally, this procedure is not so straightforward.
The Prosecutor of the ICC will not be working for the States, but for an
independent court. For an investigation to succeed a prosecutor will need
the consent of the States to enter their territory and pursue its
investigations. Sometimes States will cooperate, and sometimes States will
not. Thus, for investigations to be effective, the ICC Statute must include
provisions detailing what authorization the Prosecutor has in regards to
investigation and prosecution.
A.

The Role of the Prosecutor
According to the 1994 ILC Draft Statute, the Prosecutor was
authorized to initiate investigations whenever a State party to the ICC
Statute, or the Security Council, issues a complaint requesting the
Prosecutor take action. 60 Furthermore, for the purposes of its investigation
the Prosecutor could "request the presence of and question suspects,
victims, and witnesses; collect documentary and other evidence; conduct
on site investigations; take necessary measures to ensure the confidentiality
of information or the protection of any person; as appropriate, seek the
cooperation of any State or the United Nations. "61
The assumption implicit in the Draft Statute is that any State
requesting an investigation will cooperate with the Prosecutor, and then so
too will any State upon whose territory the Prosecutor needed to search.
However, neither the assumption of the drafters, nor the language itself,
was acceptable to most States. Some States believed that this language
would require the Prosecutor to act like a blind monkey, ignorant of the
food blatantly in front of it, until another State was kind enough to bring
the atrocities to the monkey's attention. Other States believed that a
Prosecutor with the authority to investigate without State consent would
lead to overreaching and inappropriate investigations, which could
eventually turn into witch hunts. Thus, much debate has ensued over what
type of investigations the Prosecutor can and should be allowed to
undertake, and furthermore, what end the investigations should seek.
The delegations of Canada, New Zealand and Samoa issued a
joint proposal suggesting the necessity that the Prosecutor "take
60.

Arts. 25 and 26, A/49/355.

61.

Arts. 26, A/49/355 (sub-numbering omitted).
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appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and in
so doing, respect the interests of victims and witnesses, including
age, gender, and health, and take into account the nature of the
crimes [particularly] [above all] where it involves sexual and

gender violence. "62
Furthermore, the participants of an inter-sessional meeting held in Vienna,
in April 1998, thought it important to highlight that the Court should "not
only ascertain the truth but also provide effective justice for victims, their
families, and assigns, " ' since victims are often survivors, and even when
not, victims are not merely the dead.
The Zutphen text and its revisions have ended up including similar
provisions as the ILC Draft Statute, but with numerous hurdles which the
Prosecutor would first need to overcome, such as notifying the States prior
to investigation that an investigation was to commence, and allowing States
one month to challenge the appropriateness of the Prosecutor's actions.'
Regardless, such provisions are almost all lacking consensus; they are
generally only favored by States that wish to hinder the independence of
the Court. Many other States believe that the Prosecutor should be able to
investigate whenever there is a need, and not merely when all States
consent. Much of this debate has also revolved around the appropriateness
of including into the text of the Statute one of two terms: ex officio or
proprio motu.
Proponents of the idea of a prosecutor with the authority to initiate
investigation on its own accord, tend to refer to the Prosecutor as acting
either ex officio or proprio motu. Germany, for example, stated that "the
Prosecutor of the Court should have the competence to initiate
investigations ex officio, on his or her own initiative, in any case where the
Court has jurisdiction. . .".65 Furthermore, at the inter-sessional meeting
in Vienna mentioned above, the participants entreated "that the Court be
led by a fully independent ex officio prosecutor, that can gather information
from any source."' The implication being proffered is that a prosecutor
acting ex officio would have the authority to take any action required in
order to proceed with a thorough and effective investigation.
62.

Non-Paper/WG.4/No.22, Aug. 14, 1997.

63. Vienna Declaration on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal
Court, The European Law Students' Association, United Nations Centre for International Crime
Prevention, Apr. 12-24, 1998, THE INT'L CRIM. CT. MONITOR, Issue 8, June 1998, at 12.
[hereinafter Vienna Declaration].
64. Art. 47[26], A/AC.249//L.13 (1998); A/AC.249//CRP.11 (1998); Apr. 1, 1998;
Art. 54, A/CONF.183/2/Add.1.
65. Statement by Hans-Peter Kaul, Head of the German delegation, on Aug. 4, 1997.
66. Vienna Declaration, supra note 63.
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Article 46 of the Zutphen text states: "The Prosecutor [may][shall]
initiate investigations [ex officio][proprio motu]. [or] on the basis of
information [obtained] [he may seek] from any source, in particular from
Governments, United Nations organs [and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations]." 67 The structure of the Zutphen text implies
that any text in brackets represents one of two things: that the text has not
yet been agreed upon, or that it has yet to be determined which of two or
more alternatives should be used as the proper language for that portion of
the phrase. Regarding the ex officio v. proprio motu debate, the Zutphen
text lays the terms side by side in brackets, implying that one or the other
should be chosen. In the debates many States have used the terms as if
they were synonymous, but if the terms meant the same thing, then this
choice is merely a petty debate over writing style. Obviously, it seems odd
at this stage of the negotiations, for States to introduce and quibble over
synonymous language.
Although most States use the term ex officio when referring to the type
of independent prosecutor which they seek, a growing number of States
have been substituting ex officio with the term proprio motu. A translation
of the two terms in their context indicates that ex officio refers to the duties
arising out of "the office" of the Prosecutor, whereas proprio motu refers
to the duties particular to the individual prosecutor - this is a monumental
difference.' To put it another way, an ex officio prosecutor is empowered
with the duties granted to all of the prosecutors in the Office of the
Prosecutor combined, whereas a proprio motu prosecutor is confined only
to his respective duties.
Understanding the different meanings of these terms of art clarifies
why the United States tends to prefer proprio motu whereas Germany tends
to prefer ex officio; particularly in light of United States sentiment that it is
more concerned with the possibility of an unfettered prosecutor, than is
Germany. 69 However, regardless which term, if either, is chosen, many
States have made it clear that they believe even an independent
Prosecutor's powers should not proceed without some sort of check and
balancing system. To rectify this omission, the idea of a Pre-Trial
Chamber was born.

67.

A/AC.249/L.13 (1998).

68.

BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY,

(1990);

CASSELL'S

LATIN DICTIONARY,

LATIN-

ENGLISH AND ENGLISH-LATIN.

69. BetsyPisik, US Lobbies to Protect Citizens from World Court, THE WASH TIMES,
Apr. 3, 1998, at Al; James Bone, US Seeks to Limit War Crimes Court, THE TIMES OF LONDON,
Mar. 30, 1998, at 14; Statement by Hans-Peter Kaul, Head of the German delegation, on Aug. 4,
1997.
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B.

The Role of the Pre-TrialChamber
During the August 1997 PrepCom, while States were arguing over the
Court's trigger mechanisms, and particularly whether the Prosecutor itself
should be empowered to initiate investigations on its own accord and thus
trigger the processes of the Court, the belief emerged that even a fully
independent Prosecutor needed some sort of check to keep its acts from
getting out of control. To combat this fear, the delegate of France
proposed the creation of an organ that would supervise the jurisdictional
matters of the Court. 70 The French delegate expressed the belief that the
Prosecutor needed to be supervised from the very outset of the
proceedings. 7' Furthermore, the delegate stated that a chambre d'examen
of some sort could strike a balance between the accused and the accusation,
thereby creating an office separate from the Prosecutor that could protect
the rights of the accused, and prevent proceedings from being opened at
too early a stage.7'
Initially, France's proposal met with both partial support and partial
dissent. The Canadian delegate, for example, agreed that a supervisory
chamber could be useful, but only to insure the equality of arms, and not to
interfere with the independence of the Prosecutor.'
Ireland's delegate
expressed his support for a chamber that would act as a check on the
unmonitored ex officio power of the Prosecutor, and affectionately dubbed
France's proposal the X-Chamber, since their was agreement on the
general concept, but not exactly what it should do or be called.7 4 The
Netherlands then countered with "Pre-Trial Magistrate" because there
seemed to be agreement that the chamber would not provide an
investigative judge, juge d'instruction, as allowed in civil law systems, but
would act to strike a balance between the prosecution and the defense
during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.
Seeming slightly surprised
at how other States had interpreted its proposal, France quickly pointed out
that their idea of a pre-trial chamber was merely a suggestion for how to
deal with the direct proceedings of a prosecutor who intends to conduct
investigations within a State; the implication was not meant to be any more
or any less. 76 Regardless, the idea was alive that even though no one was
quite sure how exactly such a chamber could be incorporated into the
Statute, there seemed to be initial consensus that a supervisory chamber of
some sort might be in order.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Oral intervention made on Aug. 4, 1997.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Oral intervention made on Aug. 4, 1997.
Id.

156

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 5:139

On August 5, 1997, the United Kingdom presented the first written
statement regarding the Pre-Trial Chamber. In the document, the United
Kingdom summarized its view of the initial debate:
a) Most delegations which spoke yesterday support the view that
a supervising chamber could be established to hold the balance
between the Prosecutor and the Defense in respect of certain
aspects of the investigation at the early stages of an investigation;
this would ensure equality of arms;
b) Many delegations which spoke yesterday oppose the
establishment of a chamber to supervise the work of the
Prosecutor, expressing the opinion that, if the Prosecutor is to be
independent, a supervisory role for the Court would tend to
undermine the Prosecutor's independence;
c) No clear view has emerged about whether a supervising
chamber should be set up in every case; and
d) Many delegations support the view that the rights of States
must be protected in cases where on-site investigations are to take
place. 77
Despite uncertainty concerning which powers the supervisory chamber
would be granted, references to it were quickly added to any proposal
which it might concern. In a note by the United States meant to explain a
proposal it made regarding the amendment or withdrawal of an indictment,
the commentary noted that the Pre-Trial Chamber was meant78 "to balance
the equality of arms between the prosecution and the defense. "
When the August 1997 PrepCom concluded, the idea of a Pre-Trial
Chamber was added to the official text of the proposed Statute, however,
the text was not entirely what was originally proposed by France, nor what
it will likely be in the end. According to the August 1997 official text, the
idea of the Pre-Trial Chamber contemplates that, "in exceptional
circumstances in which a unique opportunity appears to exist for the taking
or collection of evidence, the Pre-Trial Chamber may be involved in order
to assure a fair trial/protect the interests of the defense. " 7 The text also
stressed that some States believed that "the Pre-Trial Chamber should only
intervene for the purpose of checking on the lawfulness of the Prosecutor's
conduct," however, others believed the Pre-Trial Chamber's role should be
77. UK Delegation, Supervision Chamber, Non-paper/WG.4/No.3 (Aug. 5, 1997).
78. U.S. Proposal regarding amendment or withdrawal of the indictment, art. 27, para. 4
(Non-paperlWG.4/Nd.7) (Aug. 8, 1997).
79. AIAC.249/L.8/Rev.1 (Aug. 14, 1997).
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expanded to reflect "the need to ensure the Prosecutor's independence and
the desirability of conferring a limited role on the Pre-Trial Chamber."'
For the most part, the role of the Pre-Trial Chamber has not been
revisited during the formal debate at the PrepComs. It has been reflected
in the informal discussions that delegations have conducted behind the
scenes, but the official text remained the same at the end of the final
March-April 1998 PrepCom as at the end of the August 1997 PrepCom8
Although there has been little formal debate on the matter, a recent
proposal submitted by Argentina and Germany received such strong
support that it appears the debate is not yet over, nor is it likely that the
official text will remain the same.
According to the Argentine/German proposal, when the Prosecutor is
acting upon the receipt of information submitted by sources other than the
Security Council or interested States, and the Prosecutor concludes that
there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, the Prosecutor
"shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization" for an
investigation. 2 It would then be the responsibility of the Pre-Trial
Chamber to consider whether "there is a reasonable basis to proceed with
an investigation," and whether "the case appears to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court."8 3 A United States proposal which came out later
the same day, agreed that before the Prosecutor could commence
investigation of suspected criminals, "the Prosecutor must obtain a
preliminary ruling from a Pre-Trial Chamber confirming the Prosecutor's
If the Argentine/German proposal survives debate and
determination."'
ends up incorporated into the text of the Statute, then an effective means
will have been created to allow the Prosecutor to act as a third trigger
Furthermore, by incorporating the
mechanism for the Court.
would be entitled to initiate its
Prosecutor
Argentine/German proposal, the
own investigations, but at the same time the Pre-Trial Chamber would be
able to protect the rights of the defense and balance the independence of the
Prosecutor with the sovereignty of the States.
IV. COMPLEMENTARITY
Underlying every case brought before an international tribunal is the
tension between domestic and international claims over the same offenses.
This tension exists because of the universal agreement over the importance
80. Id.
81. Draft Statute Proposed to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/CRP.11, (Apr. 1, 1998); see supra note 4.
82. Draft Proposal by Argentina/Germany to the Preparatory Committee regarding a
Pre-Trial Chamber, U.N. Doc A/AC.249/1998/WG.4/DP.35, (Mar. 25, 1998).
83. Id.
84. Art. 11 bis: Preliminary Rulings Regarding Admissibility, Proposal by the United
States Delegation, Mar. 25, 1998.
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of the prevention of double jeopardy, or non bis in idem,85 that no person
should be twice tried for the same crime. To rectify this potential problem,
each of the ad hoc international military and criminal tribunals were
granted supremacy over national courts' jurisdiction. In Nuremberg and
Tokyo supremacy was accepted to a great extent because the tribunals were
set up by the undisputed victors of World War 1.86 In the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda the tribunals were again granted supremacy over
domestic jurisdiction, this time not merely because of victors' will, but
rather to maintain and restore international peace and security to the
regions. The decision to implement supremacy clauses in all of these
instances was eased by the retrospective nature of the proceedings. The
tribunals were not being created to adjudicate possible future crimes, but
rather over specific instances that had already occurred, and where
agreement had already been reached that international tribunals would be
the best forum to adjudicate such crimes.
For the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court, the
retrospective nature of the prior tribunals is impossible to maintain, and
must instead be replaced by a prospective outlook. Indeed, the ICC will
not adjudicate crimes that have already occurred, but rather crimes that
may occur after the Court has been established.87 Because of this
difference in perspective, most States are unwilling to relinquish their
future claims to the jurisdiction of an international court, especially when
their domestic judicial systems are just and effective.
To balance the ICC's ability to maintain jurisdiction (when
appropriate), with national concerns over the importance of State
sovereignty, the concept of "complementarity" was developed.
The
general premise of complementarity is that the ICC would only have
jurisdiction to try an individual when the respective national criminal
justice systems were either unwilling or unable to try the case themselves.8 8
To paraphrase the delegate of Korea, the core of the principle of
jurisdiction is to find a nexus between the ICC and the national courts; it
should not be meant to define supremacy, but rather balance.89 Although it
is easy to give a general definition of complementarity, it has been much
harder for States to agree on a specific definition that should be included in
the Statute of the ICC.

85.

Also referred to as ne bis in idem, A/AC.249//CRP.20 (1988); art.

18,

A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1.
86.
Charles W. Alexander, JUSTICE AT NUERNBERG, (1946); TELFORD TAYLOR,
THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, (1992); DANIEL GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S
WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996).
87.

Arts. 8 and 16, A/AC.249/L.13 (1998).

88.

Preamble, A/49/355.

89.

Oral intervention made on Aug. 5, 1997.
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The ILC Draft Statute proposed that the ICC could not have
jurisdiction when the crime in question:
has been duly investigated by a State with jurisdiction over it, and
the decision of that State not to proceed to a prosecution is
apparently well-founded; is under investigation by a State which
has or may have jurisdiction over it, and there is no reason for the
Court to take any further action for the time being with respect to
the crime; or is not of such gravity to justify further action by the
Court. 90
However, the ILC definition was considered to be much too broad.
At the beginning of the August 1997 PrepCom, Germany entreated,
"the Court itself should have the power to determine whether in a given
situation national trial procedures are not available or may be
ineffective." 9' Germany, joined by Canada, then issued a proposal in
which they suggested that a case would be inadmissible if "the case is
under investigation or prosecution by a State which has or may have
jurisdiction over the case, and the investigation or prosecution is being
diligently undertaken," or the diligent investigation resulted in the decision
not to proceed to prosecution, based on "well-founded . . .knowledge of
all relevant facts."
Italy proposed that in making a determination on admissibility, the
ICC should be entitled to consider whether:
there has been and continues to be unreasonable delay in the
conduct of national investigations or proceedings, or ...the said
investigations or proceedings ...were or are designed to shield
the accused from international criminal responsibility, or were or
are conducted with full respect for the fundamental rights 93of the
accused, and.., the case was, or is, diligently prosecuted.
The United States added that the burden of proof should be vented onto the
ICC, however, a dual burden is also on the States to handle the case
properly. 94
During the formal working groups some States proposed the inclusion
of the term, good faith, in the explanation of complementarity. But since
Art. 35, A/49/355 (sub-numbering omitted).
Statement by Hans-Peter Kaul, Head of the German delegation, on Aug.4, 1997.
Non-Paper/WG.3/No.3. Aug. 5, 1997.
Non-Paper/WG.3/No.4, Aug. 5, 1997.
94. Oral intervention made on Aug. 5, 1997. It was unclear from the comment made by
the US delegate whether the burden placed on States not to adulterate domestic prosecutions,
should be a legal onus or a moral responsibility.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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goodfaith was not a term utilized by, or familiar to, most civil law nations,
this too was rejected. A rolling text issued on the subject, stated that the
case would be admissible to the ICC if the relevant national criminal justice
systems were either "unable or unwilling to carry out effectively the
investigation or prosecution. " 95 The text then footnoted that phrase
"unable or unwilling" with the comment that "these terms attempt to reflect
the rationale underlying the issue of complementarity, and are suggested in
the absence of any other generally accepted phrase."'
Ironically,
however, this phrase stuck, and was included in the next rolling text' and
then in the final official text of the August 1997 PrepCom, 98 with only a
slight modification the ICC has jurisdiction over the case when "the State is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution. "9
Aspects of the complementarity principle surfaces in numerous
sections of the Statute of the ICC. However, the simple definition of
complementarity as laid out by the Zutphen Draft and its revisions, was as
follows:
1. Having regard to paragraph 3 of the preamble, the Court shall
determine that a case is inadmissible where:
a) the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution;
b) the case has been investigated by a State which has
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the
person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;
c) the person concerned has already been tried for conduct
which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is
not permitted under paragraph 2 of article 13; and
d) the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action
by the Court.

95.

Informal Consultation on art. 35, Coordinator's Draft Consolidated Text, Aug. 6,

96.
97.

Id.
Informal Consultation on Article 35, Coordinator's Draft Consolidated Text, 11 Aug.

98.
99.

AIAC.24911WG.3ICRP.2 (1997).
Id.

1997.

1997.
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2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the
Court shall consider whether one or more of the following exist,
as applicable:
a) the proceedings were or are being undertaken or the
national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court as set out in article 5;
b) there has been an undue delay in the proceedings which in
the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice; and
c) the proceedings were not or are not being conducted
independently or impartially and they were or are being conducted
in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an
intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court
shall consider whether, due to a total or partial collapse or
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to
obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings. 0oo

Heading into the Diplomatic Conference in Rome, there appears to be
consensus that this definition of complementarity will survive any further
negotiations. On the other hand, a minority of delegations still hold to the
belief that the Court should not be granted complementary jurisdiction at
all, and that the Court "has no jurisdiction where the case in question is
being investigated or prosecuted, or has been prosecuted, by a State which
has jurisdiction over it."'t° However, as the delegate of Austria pointed
out, "complementarity constitutes a guiding spirit, " " and as the delegate
of Ireland concluded, complementarity might not be the strongest grounds
for the Court to rest on, but it might be the best. 103
V. PUNISHMENT AND REPARATIONS
Thus far this paper has dealt primarily with the processes of the ICC
leading up to a trial. However, underlying the entire process including the
trial itself, is what actions the Court should take once it has determined that
100. Art. 11, A/AC.249/L.13 (1998);
A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1.
101. Id.
102. Oral intervention made on Aug. 6,1997.
103. Id.

A/AC.249/CRP.8

(1998);

Art.

15,
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a person was guilty of the crimes with which he or she was charged. Is the
purpose of this court merely to punish the world's most egregious
international criminals, or to offer satisfaction and redress to their victims
as well? To answer this final question it is necessary to examine the
possible punishments that the Court may be empowered to impose.
A.

Applicable Penalties
The ILC draft appears to have assumed that the penalties phase of the
proceedings would be quite simple and up-front. The ILC Draft stated that
the Court could impose a life sentence of imprisonment or imprisonment
for a specified number of years, and/or a f'me.'0 4 The fines could be
transferred by the Court to: the Registrar, "to defray the costs of the
trial"; 5 a State whose nationals were the victims of the crime in
question; and/or a trust fund "established by the secretary-general of the
United Nations for the benefit of victims of crime."" ° Furthermore, the
ILC Draft proposed that in determining the length of sentence or amount of
fine to be imposed, the laws of the passive personality State, the territorial
State, and the custodial State could all be taken under consideration.10 8
Although clear and concise, this draft had many holes.
The most glaring missing piece was the death penalty. Thus, upon
much political pressure the death penalty was added, at least for the time
being, into the official text as another possible penalty. The new text
explained that the Court could impose the death penalty, "as an option, in
case of aggravating circumstances and when the Trial Chamber finds it
necessary in the light of the gravity of the crime, the number of victims and
the severity of the damage."" °
However, the provision on the death
penalty was immediately placed in brackets, to indicate that it needed
further debate. After that, it was purposefully skipped over in the formal
debates, and left completely untouched leading up to Rome, except for one
minor change. The text relating to the death penalty was changed in the
Zutphen text to read as the first of two options, then the second option
merely stated, "No provision on death penalty." 1
Apparently the lines
had been drawn, but it was recognized that only the plenipotentiaries
meeting in Rome were the appropriate figures to attempt some sort of
compromise.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Art. 47, A/49/355.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
A/AC.249/CRP.1 (1997).
A/AC.249/L.13 (1998).
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Another aspect that many felt was missing from the ILC Draft was a
provision relating to minors. It was proposed that the ILC Draft should be
amended to include a provision where anyone who committed the crimes
between the ages of 13 and 18 could not be sentenced for more than 20
years of imprisonment."' However, that same text also provided that the
Court could determine that the circumstances of the case could allow the
Court to take exception and ignore age as a mitigating circumstance,
allowing minors to be sentenced as adults." 2 This second provision met
with much opposition, particularly from non-governmental organizations
and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. The Zutphen text
removed the second provision, and stated that no person who committed a
core crime while under the age of 18 could be sentenced for more than 20
years of imprisonment." 3
Debate also ensued over the applicability of national legal standards to
the imposition of penalties, but the text remained essentially the same
heading into Rome. One provision was added in brackets, "In cases where
national law does not regulate a specific crime, the Court will apply
penalties ascribed to analogous crimes in the same national law."" 4
Regardless, the entire article has been footnoted to say that "the view was5
held that this kind of provision should be avoided altogether."'
Therefore, it seems likely that the Court will be allowed to set its own
international standards for appropriate penalties, and not be limited or
hindered by domestic norms. However, "A sentence may be appealed, in
accordance with the Rules, by the Prosecutor or the convicted person on
the ground of [significant] disproportion between the crime and the
sentence." 6
Finally, during the March-April 1998 PrepCom, victim's groups
lobbied for a reordering of the listing of the types of fines that could be
collected by the Court. The delegate of France seemed to agree with the
non-governmental organizations and then argued themselves that the listing
of fines should be rearranged to reflect the difference in the importance of
each type of fine. The final official text of the March-April 1998 PrepCom
stated that fines and possibly assets collected by the Court could be
transferred to one or more of the following: a trust fund, the State whose
nationals were victims of the crime in question, and the Registrar."' Also
added to the text in brackets was a point stressing that the listing was in an
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114.
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A/AC.249//CRP.1 (1997).
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Art. 68, A/AC.249//L. 13, (1998).
A/AC.249/CRP. 13 (1998); art. 78, A/CONF. 183/2/Add.1.
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A/AC.249/WG.4/CRP.7 (1998); art. 80, A/CONF.183/2/Add.1.
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order of priority."' Furthermore, a footnote stressed that it was suggested
that there may be other options other than the first two listed, "as to the
manner in which fines or assets collected by the Court could be distributed
to victims."" 9
Reparations
The ILC Draft Statute did not include any provisions for reparations.
The closest the draft came to including provisions on reparations were the
references to how the fines collected by the Court could be distributed."2°
However, even there, the money was not going directly to victims, their
families or assigns, but rather to intermediary bodies, which could then
utilize the money in an undefined manner. To rectify this omission,
delegations suggested two areas where reparations could be incorporated
into the statute: first, as another applicable penalty; and second, as a
separate article dealing specifically with compensation to victims.
The formal debate over reparations was supposed to occur during the
Although formal
December 1997 and March-April 1998 PrepCorns.
debate did occur to some extent, most of the negotiations over reparations
occurred during informal, off the record, discussions and working groups.
However, without breaching any bonds of secrecy, it is still quite possible
to explain what developed through a look at the few official texts, which
did surface on the subject.
In the official text on the Decisions Taken by the Preparatory
Committee at its Session Held from 1 to 12 December 1997,121 the
Working Group on Penalties recommended that under the Applicable
Penalties article, a fifth penalty should be included, "Appropriate forms of
reparation." The suggestion meant that besides imprisonment, fines, and
possibly the death penalty, the Court should also be able to impose on the
convicted person the responsibility of paying reparations to victims, their
families or assigns. However, there was still much disagreement on not
only whether reparations should even be considered a penalty, but also if it
were, what wording should be used. The suggestion of the working group
read as follows: "[[without prejudice to the obligation on every State to
provide reparation in respect of conduct engaging the responsibility of the
State] [or reparation through any other international arrangement]
appropriate forms of reparation [[including] [such as] restitution,
compensation and rehabilitation]].""a This language was then inserted into
B.
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120. Art. 47, A/49/355.
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and rehabilitation), as well as the definition used to explain the term "victim", were made in
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the Zutphen text under the article on penalties and will debated more in
Rome." 3 However, not everyone was convinced that reparations were a
penalty, nor was everyone convinced that that brief explanation was
sufficient in explaining what type of reparations could be granted to
victims. Thus, another article was inserted into the Zutphen text, which
did not exist in the ILC Draft, Compensation to Victims."
The Zutphen text offered three proposals regarding Compensation to
Victims. The first proposal granted the Court with the binding authority to
declare the criminal liability of the person convicted, but granted States the
competence to determine issues of reparations." 25 The second proposal
stated that where necessary,
the Trial Chamber shall also determine the scope and extent of the
victimization and establish principles relating to compensation for
damage caused to the victims and to restitution of property
unlawfully acquired by the person convicted, in order to allow
victims to rely on that judgment for the pursuit of appropriate
forms of reparations, such as restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation either in national courts or through their
governments, in accordance with national law. 126
Essentially, this proposal allowed the Court to make recommendations as to
what it felt domestic courts or governments should award, but did not bind
the States to its judgment. Under the third proposal, it was suggested that
the Court itself should be able to order a convicted individual to issue both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary forms of reparations. 27 As could be assumed
about any text with so many different proposals, the text included in the
Zutphen Draft did not last very long before being modified.
On February 10, 1998, a joint proposal issued by France and the
United Kingdom shrunk the article into two proposals. The first, in very
broad language, granted the Court the ability to order both individuals and
States to pay reparations to victims, their families and assigns.' 12 The
second, suggested that the Court could only order a "monetary award, or
any other award by way of reparations," against an individual, but not
Power, ARes/40/34, Nov. 29, 1985, and the Revised Draft Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17, May 24, 1996.
123. Art. 68, A/AC.249/L.13 (1998).
124. Art.66, AIAC.249/L.13 (1999); Art. 73, retitled, Reparations to Victims,
A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. A/AC.249/WG.4/DP.19 (1998).
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against a State.'2 9 Furthermore, the monetary award could be comprised of
a punitive element, a compensatory element, or both, and the reparations
could include an order for restitution of property or "any other order which
the Court considers appropriate."1 30 Both proposals had their merits and
pitfalls. The first proposal allowed the Court to essentially order whatever
forms of reparations it considered appropriate, both against an individual
and a State, but did not allow for monetary awards, which is possibly the
easiest form of compensation that could be granted. On the other hand, the
second proposal allowed for monetary awards, but not from States, which
are the most likely and effective source of monetary awards and other
forms of reparations.
A rolling text issued on March 23, 1998 by the Working Group on
Procedures, combined the two proposals submitted by France and the
United Kingdom, into one text incorporating the better elements of both,
but unfortunately most of the text was still in brackets indicating lack of
consensus. In the rolling text there was agreement that the Court should be
authorized to make an order directly against a convicted individual for an
appropriate form of reparations, including restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation.'
The rolling text also seemed to indicate that there had
been agreement that monetary awards of reparations could be composed by
13 2
both an exemplary element and a compensatory element, or both.
However, it later turned out that such agreement had not in fact been
met. 3 Furthermore, included in brackets, and thus indicating a lack of
agreement, were references to the Court being able to "recommend that
Statesgrant an appropriate form of reparations to, or in respect of, victims
The final official text of the March-April 1998 PrepCom, mirrored
most of the language of the March 23,1998 rolling text. It included a
footnote explaining that the references to appropriate reparations was "to
be granted not only to victims but also to others such as the victim's
35 The official text also
families and successors (in French, "ayant-droit').1
explained, albeit in brackets, that orders of reparations made by the Court
against States could only be made "[if the convicted person is unable to do
so himself/herself; [and . . . the convicted person was, in committing the
offense, acting on behalf of that State in an official capacity, and within the
course and scope of his/her authority]]." 36 It appears that much of the
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136.
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debate that will continue with regard to compensation to victims, will be
centered on whether a monetary award could also be included as a form of
reparations, whether the ICC should compel States to make reparations,
and whether reparations should be considered a penalty, a separate form of
compensation, or both.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is cautious-optimism leading into the Diplomatic Conference in
Rome. Over 1700 sets of brackets remain in the proposed text, all of
which must be resolved before the treaty can be signed. Although many
people believe compromise can be met in time, almost as many wonder
what the cost of compromise will be. Still others are concerned that five
weeks in Rome will not be enough to hammer out the differences, and
future conferences will have to be held, possibly undermining support for
the creation of an International Criminal Court.
Much of the uncertainty exists regarding the outcome of the
negotiations because delegations are unsure where to draw the bottom line
in their compromises. Some scholars already believe that a fatal mistake
was incurred in the beginning of the PrepCois when States decided that
the Statute should not merely be the procedural creation of a court, but also
a redefinition and modernization of fundamental concepts of international
law, such as the definitions of aggression, crimes against humanity and war
crimes.
However, that choice was made, so heading into Rome
governmental and non-governmental representatives are proceeding under
the premise that both goals can be accomplished.
To help States decide what bottom line should now be drawn, many
State delegations have requested that non-governmental representatives
offer their advice as to what they see as a bottom line. No State wants to
sign a treaty that its citizens will reject. Amnesty International has
suggested sixteen fundamental 13principles for a "U]ust, fair and effective
International Criminal Court.
137.

Court,

Sixteen FundamentalPrinciplesfor a Just, Fairand Effective International Criminal

Amnesty

International,

AI

Index:

IOR

40/12/98,

(May

1998),

< http:l/www.igc.org/iccl >.

1. The Court should have jurisdiction over the crime of genocide...
2. The Court should have jurisdiction over other crimes against humanity...
3. The Court should have jurisdiction over serious violation of humanitarian law in
international and non-international armed conflict...

4. The Court must ensure justice for women...
5. The Court must have inherent (automatic) jurisdiction...

6. The Court must have the same universal jurisdiction over these crimes as any of its States
parties...
7. The Court must have the power in all cases to determine whether it has jurisdiction and
whether to exercise it without political interference from any source...
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Whether Amnesty International has highlighted the appropriate sixteen
principles is surely debatable, but at the same time their input was greatly
appreciated by the delegations. The importance of State cooperation,
respect for the principle of complementarity, and removal of political
interference from the Court, will hopefully receive unanimous acceptance.
It is beyond dispute that for the creation of the Court to be considered a
success, the ICC must be an independent, impartial, just and effective,
permanent judicial institution.
This paper has attempted to show the progression of the negotiations
on certain key elements concerning the creation of the permanent
International Criminal Court. This attempt is intended to help explain the
creation of, and how close we are to, mankind's greatest effort towards the
eradication of impunity. However, one of the biggest problems the
negotiations and the Court might face, is the basic redefinition of the core
crimes. It appears that most States are unwilling to sign onto a treaty that
does not explicitly lay out culpability. On the other hand, just as failing to
modernize the core crimes would have allowed these same States to limit
the jurisdiction of the Court to only historical frameworks, not allowing the
definitions to be reexamined in the future will limit the Court solely to the
notions of today. In 1928 no one ever dreamt of genocide. In 1948 no one
equated rape with a crime against humanity. What understandings will the
new millennium bring? Regardless of all of the obstacles we need a court
that can offer public acknowledgment of international crimes. To do so,
this Court must uphold and imbue the evolving face of international
8. The Court should be an effective complement to national courts when these courts are
unable or unwilling to bring to justice those responsible for these grave crimes...
9. An independent prosecutor should have the power to initiate investigations on his or her
own initiative, based on information from any source, subject only to appropriate judicial
scrutiny, and present search and arrest warrants and indictments to the Court for approval...
10. No political body, including the Security Council and States, should have the power to
stop or even delay an investigation or prosecution under any circumstances whatsoever...
11. To ensure that justice is done, the Court must develop effective victim and witness
protection programs, involving the assistance of all States parties, without prejudicing the rights of
suspects and the accused...
12. The Court must have the power to award victims and their families reparations,
including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation...
13. The Statute must ensure suspects and accused the right to a fair trial in accordance with
the highest international standards at all stages of the proceedings...
14. States parties, including their courts and officials, must provide full cooperation without
delay to the Court at all stages of the proceedings...
15. The Court should be financed by the regular UN budget, supplemented, under
appropriate safeguards for its independence, by the peace-keeping budget and by a voluntary trust
fund...
16. There should be no reservations to the Statute...
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criminal law, humanitarian law and human rights. Through a permanent
International Criminal Court, not only will the world's most egregious
international criminals be relieved of their impunity, but their victims will
be allowed a vehicle for satisfaction and redress.

